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Hacking Health: Unveiling Vulnerabilities in BLE-Enabled Wearable Sensor Nodes

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Sara Ghoreishizadeh, Anna Maria Mandalari

University College London



Background

- Global Market for **Wearable Sensor Nodes** → **\$33.85 billion** in 2023
- **537 million adults living with diabetes** globally in 2021
- **10% are living with type 1 diabetes**
- Year **2045**, **1 out of every 8 adults** → around **783 million** individuals, will be diagnosed with diabetes

<https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/wearable-medical-devices-market>

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
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
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Wearable Sensor Nodes


**Continuous Glucose Monitors
(CGM)**



**Blood Pressure Monitors
(BPM)**



**Electrocardiograms
(ECG)**




Oximeters

Continuous Glucose Monitors



Continuous Glucose Monitors



**Artificial Pancreas
Closed Loop Control**



Problem Statement

- **Wearable sensor nodes** connected via wireless protocols
→ **Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)** → **Cybersecurity risks.**
- Patient safety, data integrity, and the **reliability** of essential healthcare systems
→ **Artificial Pancreas technology.**
- **Single-protocol** wireless communication systems, like **BLE**
→ **Insufficient** to protect against sophisticated **cyber threats.**
- **Uncover these vulnerabilities** → **Healthcare manufacturers, policymakers, and security researchers** → **Enhance the security and resilience** of wearable sensor nodes.



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Common Wireless Attacks in BLE

- Man in the Middle (MITM) → Manipulation of Data



Man in the Middle

Common Wireless Attacks in BLE

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Man in the Middle

- Denial of Service (DoS) → Loss of View



Denial of Service

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Denial of Service

- Sniffing → Eavesdropping




Sniffing

Threat Model

Victim:

- Blood pressure lability
- Heart arrhythmia
- Hypoxemia
- Diabetes



System:

Open-loop system



ECG



Oximeter



BPM




CGM

Closed-loop system



CGM sensor




Insulin Pump

Adversary:




BLE 4.0 / BLE 5.0

Passive (Sniffing/Eavesdropping) and
Active (MITM, DoS)




Testbed & Experimental Setup


Dexcom ONE and
FreeStyle Libre2
**Continuous Glucose
Monitors (CGM)**



**Wellue Blood
Pressure Monitors
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SnapECG and
DuoEK Wellue
**Electrocardiograms
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Oxylink and
SleepO2 1400
Oximeters

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
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nRF52840 Nordic
Sniffer Dongle





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
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



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
Oxylink and
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
Bluetooth 4.0
Adapter USB
Dongles




MITM & Sniffing Auditing Methodology




MITM & Sniffing Auditing Methodology




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
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
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
Bluetooth Low Energy – Packet Format



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Oxylink Oximeter Encrypted Payload Content:


Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


615e00000000

Bluetooth Low Energy – Packet Format

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Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100



615e00000000


61 (hex) = 97 (dec) 5e (hex) = 94 (dec)

97% Oxygen Level 94/min Heart Rate

Bluetooth Low Energy – Packet Format

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
Original: Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100

??? Key: “39”

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Replay: Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d0060410000000000550000050100


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Key: “39”
Key: “db”

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
60 (hex) = 96 (dec) 41 (hex) = 65 (dec)
 96% Oxygen Level 65/min Heart Rate

???

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Oximeter Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)


ViHealth App
Real-time Data
Manipulation



Oxygen Level
Manipulation


Pulse Rate
Manipulation

ECG Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)



Unhealthy Report

BPM Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)



Typical Normal Reading

Hypertension Stage 1

CGMs Improved Security Mechanisms

Secure Connections (for initial pairing and keys exchange):


- **Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).**

→ Private keys → Public keys → ECDH → Shared secret →
KDFs → rand → EDIV → IVs →




- **Near Field Communication (NFC).**

Secure Connections



CGM Experimental Results (DoS Attacks)



Sniffing Experimental Results – Example (Dexcom ONE CGM)

- **Initial Pairing Process (ECDH Key Exchange):**

- **Public Key (Master and Slave)**
- **Random Key (Master)**
- **Pairing Confirmation (Slave)**
- **DHKey checks (Master and Slave)**

- **Established Session (Post-Pairing Communication):**

- **Random Number (rand):** All zeros.
- **Encrypted Diversifier (EDIV):** Non-random or default value.
- **Session Key Diversifiers (SKDm, SKDs):** Secure, randomized session key generation.
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Key Findings

Devices	Types of Attacks			
	Sniffing (Eavesdropping)	Passive MITM (Eavesdropping)	Active MITM (Data Manipulation)	DoS (Loss of View)
SnapECG (ECG)	✓	✓	✓	✓
DuoEK Wellue (ECG)	✓	✗	✗	✓
OXYLINK (Oximeter)	✓	✓	✓	✓
SleepO2 1400 (Oximeter)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wellue BP2A 2031 (BPM)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dexcom ONE (CGM)	✓	✗	✗	✓
FreeStyle Libre 2 (CGM)	✓	✗	✗	✓

Responsible Disclosure

- **DexCom Inc.** responded and addressed the findings → D1+ includes improved security.
- Other **manufacturers** (i.e. Abbott Laboratories, Nanjing Xijian, and Shenzhen Viatom) were contacted, but **did not respond**.
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Conclusion

- Significant **vulnerabilities** in BLE-enabled **Wearable Sensor Nodes**
→ **legacy pairing** and **secure connections** protocols.
- **Impacts and implications** → potential application of pioneering **hacking techniques** on sensitive **Wearable Sensor Nodes**.
- Importance of not relying solely on a **single wireless protocol**
→ instead depending on a **multilayered cybersecure communication system** for improved **security** and **reliability**.
- Call to action for **manufacturers & stakeholders** to address these issues.



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
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Thanks



SafeNetIoT Lab
University College London



Find Us!



<https://safenetiot.github.io/>

