



**ISCAS 2025**  
IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS  
LONDON, UK | May 25-28, 2025

# Hacking Health: Unveiling Vulnerabilities in BLE-Enabled Wearable Sensor Nodes

**Mohammad Alhussan**, Francesca Boem,  
Sara Ghoreishizadeh, Anna Maria Mandalari

University College London



# Background

- Global Market for **Wearable Sensor Nodes** → **\$33.85 billion** in 2023
- **537 million adults living with diabetes** globally in 2021
- **10% are living with type 1 diabetes**
- Year **2045, 1 out of every 8 adults** → around **783 million** individuals, will be diagnosed with diabetes

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
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
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# Wearable Sensor Nodes


Continuous Glucose Monitors  
(CGM)



Blood Pressure Monitors  
(BPM)




Electrocardiograms  
(ECG)




Oximeters

# Continuous Glucose Monitors



# Continuous Glucose Monitors



**Artificial Pancreas**  
Closed Loop Control




# Problem Statement

- **Wearable sensor nodes** connected via wireless protocols  
→ **Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)** → **Cybersecurity risks.**
- Patient safety, data integrity, and the reliability of essential healthcare systems  
→ Artificial Pancreas technology.
- Single-protocol wireless communication systems, like **BLE**  
→ Insufficient to protect against sophisticated **cyber threats.**
- **Uncover these vulnerabilities** → **Healthcare manufacturers, policymakers, and security researchers** → **Enhance the security and resilience** of wearable sensor nodes.



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# Common Wireless Attacks in BLE

- Man in the Middle (MITM) → Manipulation of Data



Man in the Middle

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Man in the Middle

- Denial of Service (DoS) → Loss of View



Denial of Service

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Denial of Service

- Sniffing → Eavesdropping




Sniffing

# Threat Model


## Victim:

- Blood pressure lability
- Heart arrhythmia
- Hypoxemia
- Diabetes




## System:

### Open-loop system



### Closed-loop system




## Adversary:



BLE 4.0 / BLE 5.0

Passive (Sniffing/Eavesdropping) and  
Active (MITM, DoS)



100 m

# Testbed & Experimental Setup

Dexcom ONE and

FreeStyle Libre2

**Continuous Glucose  
Monitors (CGM)**



**Wellue Blood  
Pressure Monitors  
(BPM)**



**SnapECG and  
DuoEK Wellue  
Electrocardiograms  
(ECG)**




**Oxylink and  
SleepO2 1400  
Oximeters**

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


Oxylink and  
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nRF52840 Nordic  
Sniffer Dongle



SnapECG and  
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


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
nRF52840 Nordic  
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SnapECG and  
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Bluetooth 4.0  
Adapter USB  
Dongles



Wireshark Tool




Kali Linux  
Mirage Tool




**ISCAS  
2025**


# MITM & Sniffing Auditing Methodology




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
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
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
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
# Bluetooth Low Energy – Packet Format



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## Oxylink Oximeter Encrypted Payload Content:


Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


615e00000000

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Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100



615e00000000


61 (hex) = 97 (dec)  
97% Oxygen Level

5e (hex) = 94 (dec)  
94/min Heart Rate

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
???  
Key: “39”

Original: Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d00615e00000000004200070e0100

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Replay: Handle “0x19”: 5500ff00000d0060410000000000550000050100

615e00000000

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
Key: “39”

Key: “db”

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
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# Oximeter Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)


ViHealth App  
Real-time Data  
Manipulation



Oxygen Level  
Manipulation

Pulse Rate  
Manipulation

# ECG Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)



Unhealthy Report

# BPM Experimental Results (MITM Attacks)



# CGMs Improved Security Mechanisms


Secure Connections (for initial pairing and keys exchange):

- **Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).**


→ Private keys → Public keys → ECDH → Shared secret →  
KDFs → rand → EDIV → IVs →



- **Near Field Communication (NFC).**



# CGM Experimental Results (DoS Attacks)



# Sniffing Experimental Results – Example (Dexcom ONE CGM)

- **Initial Pairing Process (ECDH Key Exchange):**
  - **Public Key (Master and Slave)**
  - **Random Key (Master)**
  - **Pairing Confirmation (Slave)**
  - **DHKey checks (Master and Slave)**
- **Established Session (Post-Pairing Communication):**
  - **Random Number (rand):** All zeros.
  - **Encrypted Diversifier (EDIV):** Non-random or default value.
  - **Session Key Diversifiers (SKD<sub>m</sub>, SKD<sub>s</sub>):** Secure, randomized session key generation.
  - **Session Initialization Vectors (IV<sub>m</sub>, IV<sub>s</sub>):** Sufficiently randomized.



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# Key Findings

Devices	Types of Attacks			
	Sniffing (Eavesdropping)	Passive MITM (Eavesdropping)	Active MITM (Data Manipulation)	DoS (Loss of View)
SnapECG (ECG)	✓	✓	✓	✓
DuoEK Wellue (ECG)	✓	✗	✗	✓
OXYLINK (Oximeter)	✓	✓	✓	✓
SleepO2 1400 (Oximeter)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wellue BP2A 2031 (BPM)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dexcom ONE (CGM)	✓	✗	✗	✓
FreeStyle Libre 2 (CGM)	✓	✗	✗	✓

# Responsible Disclosure

- **DexCom Inc.** responded and addressed the findings → D1+ includes improved security.
- Other **manufacturers** (i.e. Abbott Laboratories, Nanjing Xijian, and Shenzhen Viatom) were contacted, but **did not respond**.
- All **experiments** were conducted in a **controlled lab environment**.
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# Conclusion

- Significant **vulnerabilities** in BLE-enabled **Wearable Sensor Nodes**  
→ **legacy pairing** and **secure connections** protocols.
- **Impacts and implications** → potential application of pioneering **hacking techniques** on sensitive **Wearable Sensor Nodes**.
- Importance of not relying solely on a **single wireless protocol**  
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# Thanks



مؤسسة الكويت للتقدم العلمي  
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences



**SafeNetIoT**  
SECURING THE IOT

SafeNetIoT Lab  
University College London



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ISCAS  
2025

The logo for ISCAS 2025 features a stylized bridge icon next to the text "ISCAS 2025".